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ABSTRACT 
In a panel of 121 developed and developing economies, financial 
development promotes income equality in upper-middle income 
countries and inequality in low- and high-income countries. 
Finance impacts on income inequality through both the financial 
institutions and financial markets channels, though the impact of 
the financial institutions channel is relatively larger.  
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Finance and income inequality revisited 
 
1. Introduction 
Economists began to examine the link between the development of 
the financial sector and income inequality in 1990s. For example, 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) showed how financial and economic 
development could interact to give rise to an inverted u-shaped 
relationship between them.1 They present a theoretical model in 
which financial development encourages economic development which, 
in turn, facilitates necessary investment in financial 
infrastructure. In their model, economic agents operate the more 
profitable and riskier of two technologies when they can diversify 
risk by investing in financial intermediary coalitions. However, 
the fixed costs associated with the coalitions prevent low-income 
individuals from participating. On the assumption that poor 
individuals save less and accumulate wealth more slowly, income 
differences between members of intermediary coalitions and 
outsiders will widen, resulting in an increase in income 
inequality. However, since coalition costs are fixed in the model, 
all agents eventually join the coalitions, which leads to an 
eventual reversal in the income inequality trend. Thus, Greenwood 
                                                 
1 Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) had built on the Kuznets' (1955) hypothesis 
that associated economic development with first an increase and then a 
decrease in income inequality, giving rise to an inverted u-shaped 
relationship between the two variables. 
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and Jovanovic's (1990) model predicts an inverted u-shaped 
relationship between income inequality and financial sector 
development, with income inequality first increasing, then 
decreasing, and eventually stabilizing as more people join 
financial coalitions. 
 
In contrast, the models of Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and 
Newman (1993) suggest that long-run convergence in the income 
levels of the rich and the poor may not take place in the presence 
of capital market imperfections and indivisibilities in investment 
in human or physical capital; rather, income inequality might 
persist, depending on the initial wealth distribution. Galor and 
Zeira (1993) construct a two-sector model with bequests between 
generations, where agents who make an indivisible investment in 
human capital can work in a skill-intensive sector. However, given 
capital market imperfections, only individuals with bequests 
larger than the investment amount or who can borrow will be able 
to make this investment. This results in income inequality that is 
perpetuated through bequests to the next generation. In their 
model, an economy with capital market imperfections and an initial 
unequal distribution of wealth will maintain the inequality and 
grow more slowly than a similar economy with a more equitable 
initial distribution of wealth. Banerjee and Newman (1993) 
construct a three-sector model in which two of the technologies 
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require indivisible investment but where the presence of capital 
market imperfections mean that only wealthy agents can borrow 
sufficiently to undertake the indivisible (higher-return) 
technologies. Both models suggest that countries with larger 
capital market imperfections (i.e. greater difficulties in 
accessing funds to finance indivisible investments) should have 
higher income inequality and that we should observe a negative 
relationship between financial development and income inequality. 
Recent reviews of literature (see, e.g., Claessens and Perotti, 
2007; Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009; de Haan and Sturm, 2017) 
conclude that the empirical evidence on the relationship between 
finance and income inequality is also ambiguous. This is 
unfortunate given that the role of finance in income inequality 
has considerable practical importance (Clarke et al., 2003). 
First, while a reasonably robust relationship has been established 
between financial development and economic growth, policymakers 
are also interested in how the benefits from higher rates of 
economic growth are distributed.2 Second, given public concerns 
about income distribution, policymakers should be interested in 
knowing how policies affect both economic growth and income 
distribution. Finally, policymakers also likely to be interested 
                                                 
2 Beck et al. (2000), Levine (2005) and Levine et al. (2000) are key studies 
providing empirical evidence on the relationship between financial 
development and growth. 
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in whether and in what context finance can be used as an instrument 
to affect income inequality.  
 
In this paper, we revisit the empirical relationship between 
finance and income inequality and make several contributions to 
the empirical literature. First, in contrast to most studies that 
rely on the ratio to GDP of bank credit or broad money supply as 
measures of financial development, we make use of the index of 
financial development produced by the IMF, which captures better 
the depth, access, and efficiency characteristics of financial 
development (Svirydzenka, 2016). Second, we shed light on the 
relative importance of financial institutions vs. financial 
markets as channels of influence on income inequality. For this, 
we employ the two major sub-components of the IMF index, which 
measure separately the contributions to financial development from 
financial institutions and from financial markets. While there has 
been considerable research on the relative impact of these two 
channels on economic growth (e.g., Levine and Servos, 1998; Beck 
and Levine, 2004; Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2001; Luintel et al., 
2008), there has been little research as to their relative impact 
on income inequality and the research that exists provides 
conflicting results. For example, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) find 
that the importance for economic activity of services provided by 
securities markets increase relative to those provided by banks as 
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economies develop. In contrast, Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot (2011) 
and Naceur and Zhang (2019) report that the banking sector exerts 
a stronger impact on income inequality relative to that of 
financial markets. Third, the mixed results from studies regarding 
the impact of finance on inequality partly reflects differences in 
data sources, sample size and estimation methodologies. Thus, we 
employ large number of countries at different levels of income in 
our data panel, which allows us to examine the effects of finance 
on income inequality across country income groups. Finally, we 
test the robustness of our results to several different estimation 
methodologies. 
 
2. Model and data 
We estimate a dynamic panel model that takes the following form: 
 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡   (1) 
 
The dependent variable, Gini, is the Gini coefficient based on 
households’ income before taxes to proxy for income inequality 
before redistribution via the tax system. The data is from Solt’s 
(2009) Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) where 
the standardization of incomes facilitates comparisons across 
countries. Financial development, FD, is measured as either the 
IMF’s index of: (i) total financial development; (ii) financial 
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institutions development; or (iii) financial markets development. 
The Vector 𝑋 comprises a number of variables used commonly in 
estimates of the determinants of income distribution and includes 
the growth rate of real GDP, the rate of inflation, the ratio of 
foreign trade (imports plus exports) to GDP, the ratio of 
government consumption to GDP; an index of representative 
government, and a dummy variable to control for the impact of 
economic crisis. In terms of our expectations for the impact of 
the controls on income distribution: Piketty ( 2014) argues that 
low GDP growth is associated with greater income inequality; Romer 
and Romer (1999) argue that inflation depresses the average incomes 
and incomes of the poor because it adds to economic uncertainty;  
Winters et al. (2004) argue that theory and empirical evidence 
suggest that trade liberalization reduces poverty; Meltzer and 
Richard (1981) show that inequality leads to a demand for 
redistributive policies that increase the size of government; 
Acemoglu et al. (2015) make the case that more voter representation 
will increase redistribution and reduce inequality; and de Haan 
and Sturm (2017) argue that the poor suffer disproportionately 
from economic recessions. Our panel comprises annual data for 121 
countries for the period 1980-2015 with the data organized into 
five-year non-overlapping averages to abstract from short-term 
cyclical developments and because the annual income inequality 
data in SWIID are imputed for years for which data is not 
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available. More explanation of the variables, summary descriptive 
statistics and the data sources are provided in Table 1.  
 
We initially estimate panel regressions with fixed country and 
year effects because of the lack of homogeneity in the country 
sample. However, as the inclusion of fixed effects means that 
variables with little within-country time variation are not 
estimated with precision, we also present results from random 
effects estimates. One problem with such estimates of equation (1) 
is potential endogeneity. This might result, for example, if low 
income households were successful in demanding more credit to 
reduce their consumption disparities with high-income households. 
We try to address endogeneity concerns in three ways. First, in 
both sets of estimates we lag all the independent variables by one 
(five-year) period. Second, we present results in which we have 
followed the common practice of instrumenting financial 
development using and legal origin dummies and lagged values of 
the finance variable (see, e.g., Levine, 2005).3 Finally, we report 
results using the dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
methodology to obtain consistent estimates of the impact of 
financial development on income equality (Arellano and Bond,1991; 
Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
                                                 
3 La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) show that the introduction of common or civil 
law into a country via conquest or colonization affected the legal rules and 




Baseline estimates of equation (1) are reported in Table 2 with 
the results organized into three panels according to the measure 
of financial development employed. For each measure of financial 
development and for each methodology, the coefficient on the 
financial development variable is positive and statistically 
significant, which is consistent with finance promoting greater 
income inequality. The coefficients on total financial development 
(panel A) are broadly similar in size across the different 
methodologies (0.08-0.10) and are quite substantial in terms of 
economic impact, with a one standard deviation increase in 
financial development increasing the Gini coefficient by between 
1.55-2.00 percentage points in a 5-year period (where the sample 
mean for the Gini coefficient is 45.68).4 Of the control variables, 
growth of real GDP per capita reduces income inequality, but 
inflation, trade openness, government consumption expenditure, and 
economic crises appear to promote greater income inequality, and 
the coefficients on representative government are  never 
statistically significant.  The results reported in panels B and 
C of the table show that the impact of financial development on 
income inequality runs through both the development of financial 
                                                 
4 4 For example, in the fixed effects estimates of Table 2 (column 1): 
1.64=0.083(coefficient on financial development) * 19.768(the standard 
deviation of total financial development reported in Table 1). 
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institutions (panel B) and through financial markets (panel C), 
though the economic impact of financial institution development 
appears to be relatively larger with a one standard deviation 
increase in its development raising the Gini coefficient by 1.29-
1.46 percentage points compared to 0.71-1.28 in the case of 
financial markets development. This finding is consistent with 
Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot (2011) and Naceur and Zhang (2016). The 
impact of the control variables on the Gini coefficient in these 
estimates is similar to that for total financial development. 
 
In Tables 3-5, we present results for the impact of each measure 
of financial development according to country groupings classified 
according to the World Bank’s income classification system. Table 
3 reports results for total financial development. The results for 
high-income countries (panel A) and lower income countries (panel 
C) are in line with those for the full sample of countries, 
suggesting that more financial development increases income 
inequality. In these cases, the adverse impact of financial 
development on income inequality is somewhat larger on high-income 
countries than it is for lower-income countries, where the size of 
financial sector is typically significantly smaller. For example, 
a one standard deviation increase in financial development in high-
income countries raises the Gini coefficient by up to 1.95 
percentage points compared to up 1.21 percentage points in low-
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income countries. For upper-middle income countries (panel B), 
however, financial development appears to reduce income 
inequality. The coefficients on financial development are always 
negative and statistically significant and indicate that a one 
standard deviation increase in financial development reduces the 
Gini coefficient by up to 0.95 percentage points in a five-year 
period. Of the control variables, the adverse impact of trade 
openness on the Gini coefficient appears to be limited to high-
income countries, and economic crisis and representative 
government appear to impact the most in upper middle-income 
countries. Contrary to our expectations, more representative 
government appears to be consistent with more unequal income 
distribution.  
 
The same general pattern emerges from the estimates that focus on 
financial institutions development and financial markets 
development as the measures of financial development, which are 
reported in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. The coefficients on 
financial development are statistically significant and are 
positive for high- and lower-income countries and negative for 
upper-middle-income countries. That is, financial development 
impacts income inequality through both the financial institutions 
and markets channels, promoting greater income inequality in high- 
and lower-income countries and greater equality in upper-middle 
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income countries. This is broadly consistent with the Galor and 
Zeira (1993) and Galor and Moav (2004) view of a negative 
relationship between finance and income inequality as economic 
development proceeds. In addition, the impact of finance on income 
inequality (through both channels) is generally somewhat larger in 
high-income countries, and the impact of the financial 
institutions channel is generally consistently larger than that of 
the financial markets channel. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We examine the impact of financial development on income 
distribution in a panel of 121 countries. We find that the impact 
of finance changes with a country's level of income, promoting 
income equality in upper-middle income countries and inequality in 
low- and high-income countries, and that the impact of finance is 
generally larger in high-income countries. In addition, while 
finance impacts on inequality through both the financial 
institutions and financial markets channels, the impact of the 
financial institutions channel is relatively larger. Our results 
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Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Levine, R., 2001. Financial structures and 
economic growth: a cross-country comparison of banks, markets 
and development, Cambridge, MIT Press.  
Galor, O., Zeira, J., 1993. Income distribution and 
macroeconomics. Review of Economic Studies 60, 35-52. 
Gimet, C., Lagoarde-Segot, T., 2011. A closer look at financial 
development and income distribution. Journal of Banking and 
Finance 35, 1698-1713. 
Greenwood, J., Jovanovic, B., 1990.Financial development, 
growth, and the distribution of income. Journal of Political 
Economy 98, 1076-1107. 
 16 
Kuznets, S., 1955. Economic growth and income inequality. 
American Economic Review 45, 1-28.  
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 
1997. Legal determinants of external finance. Journal of 
Finance 52, 1131–1150.  
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 
1998. Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy 106, 
1113–1155.  
Laeven, L., Valencia, F., 2013. Systemic banking crises 
database. IMF Review 61, 225-270. 
Levine, R., 2005. Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence. In: 
Aghion, P., Durlauf, D. (Eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth. 
Elsevier Science, The Netherlands, pp. 866–934. 
Levine, R., Loayza, N., Beck, T., 2000. Financial intermediation 
and growth: Causality and causes. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 46, 31-77.  
Levine, R., Servos, A., 1998. Stock markets, banks, and economic 
growth. American Economic Review 88, 537-558. 
Luintel, K.B., Khan, M., Arestis, P., Theodoridis, K., 2008. 
Financial structure and economic growth. Journal of 
Development Economics 86, 181-200. 
Meltzer, A.H., Richard, S.F., 1981. A rational theory of the 
size of government. Journal of Political Economy 89, 914-927 
 17 
Naceur, S.B., Zhang, R., 2019. Financial development, inequality 
and poverty: some international evidence. International 
Review of Economics and Finance 61, 1-16.  
Piketty, T., 2014. Capital in the 21st Century. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass  
Romer, C.D., Romer , D.H., 1998. Monetary policy and the well-
being of the poor. NBER Working Paper 6793.  
Solt, F, 2009. Standardizing the world income inequality 
database. Social Science Quarterly 90, 231-242. 
Svirydzenka, K., 2016. Introducing a New Broad-based Index of 
Financial Development IMF Working Paper No. 16/5.
   
Winters, L.A., McCulloch, N., McKay, A., 2004. Trade 
liberalization and poverty: the evidence so far Journal of 





Variable description, data sources and summary statistics 









Gini coefficient The Gini coefficient measures income 
inequality, where 0 resembles a perfectly equal 
outcome and 100 per cent reflects and extremely 
unequal condition. The coefficient is based on 







 6.919  21.76  68.38 
Total financial 
development  
Financial development reflects the aggregation 
of nine indices that assess at different levels 
of abstraction how developed financial systems 
are across countries. Six lower level sub-
indices are constructed using a list of 
indicators to measure how deep, accessible, and 
efficient financial institutions and financial 
markets are. These sub-indices are aggregated 
into two higher level sub-indices that measure 
how developed financial institutions and 
financial markets are overall. Finally, these 
two sub-indices are aggregated into an overall 
measure of financial development—the Financial 





























21.542  0.03  93.25 




 3.255 -20.62  18.35 




19.846   0.08  91.04 




32.232   7.71 148.33 
Government 
consumption 






 5.169   3.92  29.58 
Representative 
government 
An index that captures contested and inclusive 






25.321   0.00   94.67 
Economic crisis Dummy variable ranging between 0 to 3 for each 
year depending upon whether a country 
experienced no crisis or one or more of a 
systemic banking crisis, a currency crisis, or 








 0.729   0.00    4.00 
Note. SWIID is the Standardized World Income Inequality Database; IMF is the International Monetary Fund; WDI is the World 






For the purpose of calculating the economic impact of financial development across country groups, the relevant standard 
deviations for the different measures of financial development are: (i) high-income: total financial development, 20.696; 
financial institutions development, 17.559; financial markets development, 25.327; (ii) upper-middle income:  total 
financial development, 12.573; financial institutions development, 13.133; financial markets development, 15.754; and (iii) 
low- and lower-middle income: total financial development, 7.869; financial institutions development, 8.569; financial 
markets development, 10.832. 
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Table 2 






A Total financial development     
Lagged Gini     0.1071*** 
(0.0134) 

























































Arellano-Bond AR1/AR2  (p-values) 
Sargan test (p-value) 
 
B. Financial Institutions 
development 
0.168 0.168 0.167  
0.009/0.876 
0.502 
Lagged Gini     0.3360*** 
(0.0934) 

























































Arellano-Bond AR1/AR2  (p-values) 
Sargan test (p-value) 
 
C. Financial markets development 
0.120 0.120 0.117  
0.019/0.563 
0.200 
Lagged Gini     0.2870** 
(0.1168) 

























































Arellano-Bond AR1/AR2 (p-values) 
Sargan test (p-value) 




710 observations in each  panel. IV=instrumental variables. ***, ** and ∗ indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Total financial development and income inequality by country income classification: dependent 
variable Gini coefficient 
 Fixed effects Random effects IV GMM 
A. High-income countries     
Lagged Gini     0.7372*** 
(0.0288) 

























































Arellano-Bond AR1/AR2 (p-values) 
Sargan test (p-value) 




B. Upper middle-income countries 
    
Lagged Gini   
 
   0.7095*** 
(0.1084) 
























 Trade openness   0.0171 
 (0.0150) 































Arellano-Bond AR1/AR2 (p-values) 
Sargan test (p-value) 




C. Lower- and lower-middle-
income countries 
    
Lagged Gini    0.000 
(0.000) 

























































Arellano-Bond AR1/AR2 (p-values) 
Sargan test (p-value) 




Notes.  Observations: panel A=234, panel B=194., panel C=-282 obs. . IV=instrumental variables. GMM 




Financial institutions development and income inequality by country income classification: 
dependent variable Gini coefficient 
 Fixed effects Random effects IV GMM 
A. High-income countries     





























































Arellano-Bond AR1/AR2 (p-values) 
Sargan test (p-value) 




B. Upper middle-income countries 
    





























































Arellano-Bond AR1/AR2 (p-values) 
Sargan test (p-value) 




C. Lower- and lower-middle-
income countries 
    










  0.0492*** 
(0.0187) 

















































Arellano-Bond AR1/AR2 (p-values) 
Sargan test (p-value) 





Observations: panel A=234, panel B=194., panel C=280 obs. . IV=instrumental variables. GMM 




Financial markets development and income inequality by country income classification: 
dependent variable Gini coefficient 
 Fixed effects Random 
effects 
IV GMM 
A. High-income countries     
Lagged Gini     0.7956*** 
(0.0614) 



























































Sargan test (p-value) 
 0.095  0.091  0.092  
0.039/0.899 
0.689 
B. Upper middle-income 
countries 
    
Lagged Gini     0.8421*** 
(0.0818) 



























































Sargan test (p-value) 
 0.128  0.124  0.129  
0.021/0.217 
0.305 
C. Lower- and lower-middle-
income countries 
    
Lagged Gini     0.5408*** 
(0.0920) 






























































Sargan test (p-value) 
0.630 
 Observations: panel A=234, panel B=196, panel C=280  obs. . IV=instrumental variables. GMM 
estimates are system. ***, ** and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
